This week in our groups we discussed the articles that we had to read. Our group article was ‘A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996) By Gigerenzer, On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics’.
I think that the main goal of the article was to understand cognitive processes that produce both valid and invalid judgements.
I felt that the article was quite heated in some parts when Gigerenzer was opposing Kahneman and Tversky. This is because Kahneman and Tversky wrongly asserted that Gigerenzer simply claimed that frequency formats make all cognitive illusions disappear. Whereas, Gigerenzer proposed and tested models that actually predict when frequency judgements are valid and when they are not. The issue is not whether or not, or how often cognitive illusions disappear. The focus should be on the construction of detailed models of cognitive processes that explain when and why they disappear.
We also discussed the topic of cognitive process models which came up within the article. Information/cognitive Processing Models are frameworks used by cognitive psychologists to explain and describe mental processes. The model is similar to the thinking process to how a computer works. As just like a computer, the human mind takes in information, organizes and stores it to be retrieved at a later time.
However Gigerenzer stated though the proposed models of cognitive processes that predict when frequency and probability judgments are valid and when they are invalid according to certain norms and that also explain why.
In the conclusion of his article Gigerenzer admitted that Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics and biases based program has had a tremendous and stimulating effect on research. But that overall we will need models that make surprising and falsifiable predictions and that reveal the mental processes that explain both valid and invalid judgment.
My personal view about the article was that I found it hard to understand by itself, however when both articles were discussed I found it easier to follow.
I believe that Gigerenzer was trying to explain that heuristics (which are mental shortcuts that simplify problems or tasks) explain both little and too much. They explain too little because we still do not know exactly how they work and why and they explain too much because often, one heuristic can be applied to almost any experimental result. Also, he points out that there are two main obstacles to understanding heuristics. First, the norms for analyzing reasoning are often too narrow, so that when judgments change from these norms, they are wrongly labeled as “cognitive illusions.” The second is that heuristics are generally too vague to count as explanations, so basically researchers can understand the research however they wish. He then suggests that instead of heuristics that can explain everything and nothing, researchers should use strategies and models to make predictions and reveal the mental processes that explain both valid and invalid judgments (Gigerenzer 1996).